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1 |
Let Your Choice Be Your Voice: Eliciting Popular Climate Policy Preferences from Decisions with Real Consequences
Flörchinger, Daniela. - Essen : RWI – Leibniz-Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, 2025
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2 |
Beyond Control: Policy Incoherence of the EU Emissions Trading System
Willner, Maximilian. - Mannheim : SSOAR, GESIS – Leibniz-Institut für Sozialwissenschaften e.V., 2022
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3 |
Closing the Implementation Gap: Obstacles in Reaching Net-Zero Pledges in the EU and Germany
Perino, Grischa. - Hamburg : Universitätsbibliothek der HafenCity Universität Hamburg (HCU), 2022
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4 |
Environmental Policy
Bruns, Hendrik. - Hamburg : Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Hamburg, 2019
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5 |
Why the EU Market Stability Reserve deters long-term low-carbon investments
Enthalten in Universität Hamburg. Fakultät Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften: WiSo-HH working paper series 2017, Nr. 44
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6 |
Remove or reserve? Allowance prices and design choices in Phase IV of the EU Emission Trading System
Enthalten in Universität Hamburg. Fakultät Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften: WiSo-HH working paper series 2017, Nr. 36
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7 |
The Climate Policy Hold-Up: Green Technologies,Intellectual Property Rights, and the Abatement Incentives of International Agreements
Goeschl, Timo. - Heidelberg : Universitätsbibliothek Heidelberg, 2015
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8 |
The price and emission effects of a market stability reserve in a competitive allowance market
Enthalten in Universität Hamburg. Fakultät Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften: WiSo-HH working paper series 2015, Nr. 28
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9 |
Climate campaigns, cap-and-trade and carbon leakage: Why trying to reduce your carbon footprint can harm the climate
Enthalten in Universität Hamburg. Fakultät Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften: WiSo-HH working paper series 2015, Nr. 23
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10 |
Do Renewable Energy Policies Reduce Carbon Emissions? On Caps and Inter-Industry Leakage
Enthalten in Universität Hamburg. Fakultät Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften: WiSo-HH working paper series 2015, Nr. 21
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Administration
