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1 |
Optimal Penalties for Repeat Offenders – The Role of Offence History
Enthalten in The B.E. journal of theoretical economics Bd. 16, 2016, Nr. 2: 545-578. 34 S.
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2 |
Standard Oriented Environmental Policy: Cost-Effectiveness and Incentives for ‘Green Technology’
Enthalten in German economic review Bd. 11, 2010, Nr. 1: 86-107. 22 S.
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3 |
Environmental Liability Law and Induced Technical Change: The Role of Spillovers
Enthalten in Journal of institutional and theoretical economics Bd. 164, 2008, Nr. 2: 254-279
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4 |
A Micro Foundation of Core Stability in Positive-Externality Coalition Games
Enthalten in Journal of institutional and theoretical economics Bd. 162, 2006, Nr. 2: 329-346
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5 |
Toward a positive theory of coalition formation and endogenous instrumental choice in global pollution control
Enthalten in Public choice Bd. 96, Nr. 1-2, date:7.1998: 145-186
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6 |
A note on Coasean dynamics
Enthalten in Environmental economics and policy studies Bd. 9, 1.3.2008, Nr. 1, date:3.2008: 57-66
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7 |
Environmental liability law and R&D subsidies: results on the screening of firms and the use of uniform policy
Enthalten in Environmental economics and policy studies Bd. 17, 10.2.2015, Nr. 4, date:10.2015: 521-541
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8 |
Game Theory and Environmental and Resource Economics—In Honour of Alfred Endres, Part Two
Enthalten in Environmental and resource economics Bd. 65, 16.8.2016, Nr. 1, date:9.2016: 1-4
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